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Friends of Domestic Industry

Address...at New York,
Ontober 26,1831.



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ADDRESS

OF THE

FRIENDS OF DOMESTIC INDUSTRY,


ASSEMBLED

IN CONVENTION, AT NEW-YORK,


OCTOBER 26, 1831,

TO

THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.



Published by order of the Convention.



BALTIMORE, NOVEMBER 10, 1831.

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TO THE
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FELLOW-CITIZENS—

A numerous delegation from several states in the Union have convened in the city of New York representing great national interests which they are anxious, by the most efficient but peaceable means, to defend and support. In addressing themselves to the people of the United States, they invoke their candid attention to several topics of great national importance, without assuming any authority ultimately to decide them; conscious that their reasonings and opinions can have, and ought to have, no other influence or force than belongs to their truth and soundness.

A system of laws imposing duties for the encouragement and protection of domestic industry, upon the faith of which a large portion of the people of this country have invested their property and given a new direction to their labour, and with a continuance of which are completely identified all their hopes of maintenance for themselves and their families, has been recently denounced as “distinguished by every characteristic which may define a tyranny, the most odious.” The entire abolition of this system, vitally involving the interests of Farmers, Mechanics, Manufacturers, Merchants and all the labouring classes, has been demanded in a tone that offers no hope of condition or compromise. A submission to such a demand, with or without the consent of those who must be the victims, would be marked by such scenes of ruin and despair, as no one, not blinded by the strongest passions of our nature, could witness without compunction.

We address ourselves, then, to the enlightened patriotism of our fellow-citizens in every part of the Union; and we earnestly entreat them to accompany us in the examination which we propose to make of the arguments and statements recently put forth; appealing to their clear discernment of truth, their high sense of duty and their calm moral courage to avert the evils that now seem to threaten the prosperity and peace of the country.

Of these topics, the first in order and the gravest in character, respects the

constitutional power of Congress to pass the laws which are the subject of complaint.

As a constitutional question the inquiry is not whether the laws are wise or unwise, whether in their operations they are always equal, or sometimes unequal, or whether individuals may not think them so wide a departure from a just administration of the powers of the government as to be, in an indefinite and loose sense, inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution. The true and real question is, do they exceed the power of the law-giver; and do they, for that reason, fail to be obligatory?

We dissent from the notion that laws plainly unconstitutional may be yet so framed as to escape the animadversion of courts of law. If unconstitutional, their true character will either appear on their face or may be made to appear by stating the facts which fasten that character upon them. And if the motives, which are supposed to have influenced Congress in their enactment are not facts which may be properly inquired into to give them this character, the reason is, not that Congress has executed an unlawful power or veiled an unlawful purpose under a general law, but that the general power being given to Congress, to pass such laws, the purpose of the law, like its occasion, its duration, or any other part of its character, is constitutionally referred to the discretion of Congress.

The present constitution has been in operation (with a success not more gratifying to ourselves than surprising to the rest of the world) for forty-two years. Twenty-one different Congresses, regularly elected and appointed by the people, and their agents, and the state Legislatures, have successively assembled to enact laws under its authority. Seven distinguished individuals have been called by the voice of the country to the chair of the Chief Magistracy, all holding and some of them, on various occasions, having exercised the power of giving a negative to such acts of Congress as, in their opinion, transcended the just limit of legislative authority. During the same period a supreme Judicial Tribunal has existed, not less distinguished for purity and talent than for dignity and importance, whose high function it properly is to pronounce its solemn judgment on the constitutional extent of the power of Congress whenever any exercise of that power is complained of and the case is brought duly before it. Most of these successive Congresses have passed laws similar in character, in design, and in effect, to the acts now complained of; and all of them have unequivocally sanctioned their principle. All these Chief Magistrates, in like manner, have, without doubt or hesitation, recognized the existence of the power; and no question of its validity has been raised in the Judicial Tribunals.—It is under this weight of authority, and this length of practice in its favour, and after the investment, upon the faith of it, of a capital probably amount-

ing to two hundred and fifty millions of dollars, that a disposition has now sprung up to deny the power altogether, and to propose, if its exercise be persisted in, a resort to such means of redress as threaten the Union.

We cannot but persuade ourselves that before the American People abandon a system of laws, now of long continuance, passed at different times by the constituted authorities with the full approbation of the whole country; and especially, before they break up their Government and return to a state of anarchy, on the ground that such laws are unconstitutional, they will give to that question a very careful and serious consideration.

Before proceeding to express the general views entertained on this important subject by the members of this convention, it is not altogether uninteresting to inquire how far admissions or concessions have been made by those who deny the existence of the power, notwithstanding the general and positive terms in which that denial is expressed.

It seems to us, indeed, that the plain object of the constitution, and the strong reason of the case, have driven those who deny the power, even upon their own mistaken view of its source, into the necessity of making admissions which, when made, leave no ground for their argument. They deny that Congress can rightfully lay duties for the sole, or the main purpose, of encouraging manufactures; but they admit, at the same time, that Congress may lay duties for revenue, and that, in laying such duties, it *may so arrange them as incidentally to give protection to manufactures*. They admit, too, that Congress may lay duties not designed for revenue, *but designed to countervail the injurious regulations of foreign powers*. Are not these concessions inconsistent with the main proposition? How can it be longer denied that Congress may lay duties for protection, after it is conceded that it may arrange duties with that view? It cannot be true that the power was given for revenue only, and that it ought to be strictly confined to that object, and true, also, that, in selecting subjects of duties, regard may be had to a different object.

An individual in society is the consumer of a particular foreign article; he finds it heavily taxed by duties, while other articles, equally capable of producing revenue, are untaxed. Does it make any difference to him, whether the article necessary to him was seized on, as the main purpose of the law, with the sole object of protection, or whether it was only *incidentally selected* in order to favour the manufacturer, while the commodities consumed by his neighbours, though equally fit subjects for a tax for revenue, are passed over in this incidental arrangement? Will not every ingenuous mind at once agree that if the power to lay duties was conferred on Congress for the sole purpose of revenue, it is a violation of its trust to mingle any other purpose with that, as much as it would be to substitute an entire new

purpose for it? Congress cannot look with one glance to revenue, and the other to protection, if the constitution limit its power to revenue alone. When it is thus said that protection is a fit object to be regarded *incidentally*, in laying duties, but that the general purpose must still be revenue, who shall inform us how much, in the motives of Congress, must be the main purpose of revenue, and how much may be the incidental purpose of protection? How high may the incidental object rise, and the law be yet constitutional; or at what point will it have approached so near the main, or the only object of the duty, as to render the law void? It may be answered, possibly, that the admission goes no farther than this: that when Congress has already resolved to lay duties, then it may, as a subsequent resolution, resolve to lay them on such a selection of articles as shall best favour manufactures. But would not such a subsequent resolution be wholly aside from the exercise of a mere revenue power? Would it not be a clear imposition of duties for protection? And might it not lead, practically, to the same consequences, since, under this admitted power of selection and arrangement, the whole burden of the government might be laid with a direct view to protection merely.

The other admission, that is, that Congress may lay duties *to countervail the commercial relations of other states*, seems to us still more decisive. This concedes, at once, that the power to lay duties is not a mere revenue power; for here is one admitted case, in which it may properly be exercised, which has no relation to revenue. Yet this is no particular or specified power. The constitution no more points out this, as being a proper object, than it points out protection. If it be provided for at all, it is because it is embraced in the general words of the grant. It is there, or it is no where. Laws, laying duties to countervail the regulations of other states, are regulations of trade. They are not only *like* laws of protection, but they are, emphatically, *themselves laws of protection*. They have usually no other end or design than to protect the manufactures or other interests of our own citizens from the effect of unequal competition or monopoly on the part of other nations. Congress, then, upon this admission, may lay duties with the single object of encouraging certain descriptions of domestic employment or industry; and it remains for those who concede this, and yet deny the general power, to show how it is, that Congress has power, in its discretion, to protect some classes of industry and no power, in the same discretion and by the same means, to protect others. But the admission goes still further. It not only furnishes an analogy for the case in argument, but meets and covers that identical case. The laws so much opposed, and whose constitutional validity is so loudly denied, are themselves no other than so many acts passed *to countervail the injurious commercial regulations of foreign states*.

The United States have not been the first to reject the theory of free trade. They have not introduced into the world new modes of legislation. They have not originated a system of protection; far otherwise. At the very moment they had succeeded to throw off their colonial bondage and had established their own independence they found that their condition, so far as respected Commerce, Agriculture and Manufactures, was but partially bettered by the change, because they found the ports of the leading states of Europe shut against their ships and against their products. They offered free trade to all nations; but the nations, with one accord, rejected their offer. The subjects of other states were protected, as against them, by the laws of other states; but *they* were protected against nobody. It is undeniably true, that this condition of things was one of the very causes which led to the adoption of the present government. It is unquestionable, as matter of historic record, that one strong motive for forming and establishing the present constitution was to organize a government that should possess the power of countervailing these foreign regulations by adequate measures and thereby protecting the labour and industry of the people of the country. Countervailing laws were accordingly passed at the very first session of the first Congress; others have been passed at various times since; one and all, they partake of the same character; they are all countervailing laws rendered expedient and necessary by the policy pursued by other nations. The Republic is now composed of thirteen millions of people; all the principal products of eight or nine of these thirteen millions are, at this moment, shut out from the great market of consumption abroad, either by absolute prohibition or by high duties; and it is to meet this state of things, it is to countervail these foreign regulations, so injurious to us, it is to place ourselves on some footing of equality, it is to rescue the labour of the American people from an inferiority, a subjection, at once dishonourable and burdensome, at once degrading to its character while it increases its toils, that those very laws were originally passed, have all along continued, and now exist. They are, therefore, countervailing laws and no other, in every just sense of these terms.

Having made these remarks on what is conceded by those who deny the power of Congress to protect manufactures, and on the effect of that concession, we proceed to present the view which this meeting entertains on the general constitutional question.

By the constitution Congress has power, "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises." It has power also "to regulate commerce with foreign nations."

The power to lay duties is accompanied by one express qualification or limitation, which is, "that all duties shall be uniform throughout the

United States." The power to regulate commerce has its limitation also, which is, that no regulation of commerce shall give preference to the ports of one state over those of another; and there is another limitation, which may apply to both clauses, namely, that no export duty shall ever be laid.

Here then is a grant of power in broad and general terms, but with certain specific limitations, carefully expressed. But neither of these limitations applies, in any manner, to that exercise of the power which is now under consideration. Neither of them, nor any other clause or word in the whole constitution manifests the slightest intention to restrain the words so as to prohibit Congress from laying duties for protection. The attempt is nothing less than to add a restriction which the constitution has omitted. Who has authority to add this? If other restrictions had been intended they would have been expressed. When the business of limitation was before the convention what was omitted was as much an exercise of intention as what was expressed. It stated all the restraints on Congress which it intended; and to impose others now would be, not to interpret the constitution, but to change it; not to construe the existing instrument, but to make another.

The words of the grant being general, to lay duties and to regulate commerce, their meaning is to be ascertained by reference to the common use and import of language. No unusual signification is to be given to the terms, either to restrain or enlarge their import. Congress, in its discretion, is to lay duties and to regulate trade for all the objects and purposes for which duties are ordinarily laid and trade ordinarily regulated. If such a thing was never before heard of as laying duties and regulating trade with a view to encourage manufactures, then it might be said that the convention did not contemplate such an exercise of the power by Congress. But it was perfectly known to the convention and to the people of this country that one leading object with all governments, in laying duties and regulating trade, was, and for a long time had been, the encouragement of manufactures. This was emphatically true of England whose language the convention spoke and whose legal and legislative phraseology was theirs also. Every leading state of Europe was, at that moment, regulating its commerce for purposes of this nature. Such a purpose, indeed, had been long sought to be accomplished by some of the states themselves, by their own regulations of trade. Massachusetts had attempted it, New-York had attempted it, Virginia had attempted it, and we believe other states had done the same. How ineffectual all their attempts were, for want of union and a general system, was soon seen, and felt, by the whole country; but they shew to what ends, and to what uses the power to regulate trade was understood to extend. But not only in other na-

tions, and in the states, before the adoption of the present Constitution, as we shall have occasion to show hereafter, but in the United States since, and in the administration of this very constitution, regulations of trade have been made, in almost innumerable instances, with no view to revenue, but with a sole and exclusive regard to protection.

If our understanding of the constitution be not according to its true meaning, that instrument has been grossly violated from the very beginning. What are all the registry acts; what the bounties on the fisheries, but so many avowed efforts to protect American Industry, under the power of regulating trade? On what foundation, does the whole system of the coasting trade stand? The American ship-builder and ship-owner has enjoyed, from the first, and we think properly, not only protection in that trade, but the monopoly of it. He shuts out all foreign competition, and he does so on the ground that the public good is promoted by giving him this advantage. We think he is right in asking this, and the Government right in granting it. Yet this is not free trade: it is preference;—it is *protection*, and protection of a manufacture under the power to regulate trade. The laws giving this protection to the manufacture and the use of ships may be wise and laws protecting other manufactures, may be unwise. But the first cannot be constitutional and the latter not constitutional. If there be power for one, there is power for both. Both are drawn from the same grant, both operate by the same general means, and both regard the same object, the protection, namely, of American labour and capital against foreign competition. If it be said that the navigation act is founded in national policy and that it is essential to national defence and national independence, we admit it. But we answer, in the first place, that Congress could not exercise a power not granted, merely because it might be useful or necessary: and, in the second place, we say that the same remark is true of the policy of protecting manufactures. That policy, also, is essential to national independence.—Iron, hemp and clothing for sailors and soldiers are not less indispensable to national defence than ships and seamen. Not only in the general use of language, then, does the power of laying duties and regulating trade extend to the protection, by the use of such means, of domestic manufactures, but such has been the constant interpretation of the constitution itself.

We think, indeed, that when a general power is given to Congress by the constitution of the United States, in plain and unambiguous words, their acts are constitutional and valid if they are within the scope of the granted power; and that, in considering the validity of the law, the motives of the legislature can never be investigated. Having granted the power,

with such limits expressed as were thought proper, its exercise, within those limits, is left to the discretion of Congress.

What is the true character of the opposite doctrine? It is, that the constitutionality of a law depends, not on its provisions and enactments, but on the motives of those who passed it. Is not such a notion new? How are we to ascertain the motives of a legislature? By private enquiry; by public examination; by conjecture? The law may be passed on mixed motives: some members voting for revenue; some for protection; or one house may act with one view, and the other house with another. What will be the character of such a law?

According to this new theory, if the motives be constitutional then the act is; if the motives be unconstitutional then the act is unconstitutional also. It follows, therefore, that a law passed by one Congress may be constitutional which, if passed by another, though in the same words, would be unconstitutional. Besides, on this theory a law may be unconstitutional for its omissions as well as its enactments; because, in laying duties, articles may be omitted as well as articles inserted, from a design to favour manufactures.

We may pursue this inquiry a step farther.

In order to ascertain whether an act were passed *primarily* for revenue, the construing power must be authorized to inquire whether that revenue be *necessary*. For if it be conceded that Congress has a constitutional power to raise an indefinite amount of revenue, such a concession will cover any system of imposts that may ever be adopted. The right to raise more revenue than the expenses of government require implies the exercise of a power to tax under circumstances in which the raising of revenue cannot be a primary purpose, but in which a purpose to protect industry or, in other words, what has been called the incidental object, may be rendered, in effect, the principal object of the tax, although veiled under the revenue power. For these reasons we say it follows as an inevitable consequence, under this view of the source of the protective power, that the constitutionality of any system of imposts, professing to be directed to revenue, must depend upon the fact whether that revenue be *necessary* to the government or not.

The statement of such a consequence is sufficient to show what endless difficulties must embarrass the operations of the government in defining the limits of this incidental protection, which has been alleged to be the only protection that the constitution allows, and of itself affords, what we conceive to be, an unanswerable argument against referring the right to protect industry exclusively to that clause of the constitution which authorizes Congress to lay imposts for the purposes of revenue.

To determine whether any proposed amount of revenue be necessary

would, in a great number of cases, prove a fruitful source of vexations and unprofitable controversy. One party,—conceiving it wise to improve the face of their territory with expensive roads and canals, to provide fortifications and the munitions of war, and to accumulate treasure in the expectation of national difficulties,—would find good reason to maintain that a *large* revenue was indispensable to the nation. With this party a high and burdensome rate of imposts, fully adequate to the most extensive protection of manufactures that has ever been asked for, would be a constitutional application of the revenue power. Another party, more thrifty in their policy, holding that the expenditures of the government should be graduated to the lowest practicable scale of economy, would contend that nothing should be raised by duties above the ordinary supplies necessary for the pay of the public agents. With this class all the excess, above the sum that they might hold to be necessary, would be the fruit of an unconstitutional tax. Who should judge between these conflicting opinions? If such were the limits upon the power of Congress it would be true, as has been said, that there might be acts in violation of the constitution which would elude the notice of the judicial tribunals; but the evident absurdity of subjecting the right to exercise fundamental powers to so vague and intangible a standard of interpretation, furnishes one of the most satisfactory proofs that no such intention existed in the minds of those who framed our constitution.

Pursuing the investigation, it will be found that the difficulty attending this notion of the source of the protecting power does not end with the impracticability of determining upon the *necessity* of revenue. It goes still deeper. It is affirmed, and no doubt with truth, that a reduction of duties upon the necessities or customary luxuries of a nation frequently increases the revenue. In such an event the defenders of the position that the power of Congress is limited to the supply of a necessary revenue, will find themselves unexpectedly put in possession of a surplus income which, according to the assumed principle, they had no right to raise; and it will be apparent that the people will be even more taxed than they were before; for the duty having been rendered productive of a larger amount of revenue to the government, a greater aggregate sum will have been taken from the pockets of the people; and it will then be found that Congress, instead of lessening the public burthens by their reduction of duties, will have only been encouraging the consumption of a greater quantity of the taxed article. A large consumption with a small tax being, in this case, more than equivalent to a small consumption with a large tax. And thus, in spite of all the precautions which the most scrupulous guardians of the constitution may exercise, the public functionaries, against their will and with the most conscientious desire to avoid infractions of the law, will oftentimes be fated to discover that they have produced unconstitutional results. The only rem-

edy for which would seem to be to abandon this intractable mode of taxation by imposts and resort to direct taxes upon the people.

As long, however, as such results may follow the reduction of duties, it will be seen that a system which merely increases the consumption of imported commodities without diminishing the revenue will be, in effect, the adoption of a policy for the encouragement of *foreign industry*. And we might here pause and ask, whether it can be supposed that the founders of our government intended to give a power to Congress to adopt a scheme of policy directed to the encouragement of *foreign labour* by a scale of low duties, without also allowing to that body a right, when they found it convenient, to encourage *domestic industry* by a higher scale of duties? Let those who answer this question in the affirmative, show some reason for the opinion that the convention which framed the constitution should set more value upon a power to encourage foreign industry, under any possible necessity to exercise it, than upon a similar power to encourage and protect our own.

We think we have said enough to indicate the pernicious tendencies of the doctrine, sustained by many eminent citizens of our land, which ascribes the right to protect domestic manufactures, solely to the revenue power conferred by the constitution upon Congress; and have demonstrated that this error, if adopted, must lead the public functionaries into practical embarrassments entirely irreconcilable with a wholesome administration of the laws.

With a view to show that the protection of manufacturing industry is mainly referrible to the power to regulate commerce, and was intended to be embraced by the clause of the constitution that invests the supreme legislature with that power, in addition to the suggestions that we have already made, we deem it not unprofitable briefly to recur to the history of the country, from which we shall derive lights that may guide us to the most unerring conclusions in confirmation of our doctrine. The narrative of events from 1783 to 1787, the circumstances attending the adoption of the constitution and the range of its early operations, whilst yet in the hands of its authors, afford a mass of testimony that Congress has but responded to the expectations of the country in so regulating trade as to furnish the requisite protection to the expansion and growth of our own labour.

The *regulation of commerce* was not a new term invented by the framers of the constitution. It was at the time of the adoption of that instrument by the people a term familiar to their apprehension and impressed upon their understandings, by the strongest comments that the history of oppression could furnish. The war of the revolution, that had just closed, sprang out of the conflicts in which this subject had been presented in the countless forms which an engrossing topic of complaint may be supposed to assume in

the discussions of an excited and rebelling people. The same subject had been canvassed in the British Parliament until argument and declamation were exhausted. The mother country had regulated the commerce of the colonies, through a series of odious and unfeeling restrictions, for more than a century, until the phrase had acquired the notoriety of a hateful grievance. She had fettered their trade by cruel prohibitions, and controlled their labour by systems of denial that reduced them to the lowest state of suffering; yet it is remarkable, that, deeming this oppressive policy a lawful exercise of the prerogative of regulating commerce, the colonists submitted to these evils with a resignation that indicated their sense of the duty of obedience to an acknowledged though misused power. All manufactures calculated to bring wealth into the country, were strictly forbidden; the erection of forges, for example, was denounced as a nuisance, and these establishments were liable to be abated by that name: it was declared unlawful to export the simplest fabrics, even of shoes or hats, from one province to another. Still the people did not deny the legality of these attempts to *regulate commerce*. But when the right was assumed to *collect revenue* in the colonies for the benefit of the mother country, the first assertion of such a principle was met by open rebellion. The distinction was palpable enough, to every man, between these two pretensions of authority. It is worthy of remark, that Lord Chatham, in 1765 in the British House of Commons, distinctly defined the two branches of power in terms that literally apply to the subject we have been discussing, and which show how clearly they were brought to the notice of the country: 'there is a plain distinction,' is his language, 'between taxes levied for the purpose of raising a revenue, and duties imposed *for the regulation of trade*, for the accommodation of the subject; although in the consequences, *some revenue might incidentally arise from the latter*.'—Indeed, the whole tenor of the public discussion on those subjects, so rife at that period throughout England and America, furnishes the most conclusive evidence that a specific idea was attached to the phrase incorporated into our constitution, and that its scope was to include the idea of levying duties in such a form as to encourage and protect, or, at least, to control and direct the growth of domestic industry.

The complaints against the articles of confederation, for which the constitution was substituted, embraced, amongst other things, an objection to the forms by which the legislation in reference to the regulation of commerce was impeded; and it was a prominent design of the new constitution to remedy this defect. The right to lay even prohibitory duties was freely admitted in the discussions upon the constitution; and we may safely affirm that the whole nation, at that day, regarded such a power as one of the necessary conclusions from the grant that had been made. The subsequent action of the government corroborates this idea. The first ap-

proaches of the people to their new rulers were made in behalf of the exercise of a protecting power in favour of their industry. They spoke of the injury they had sustained under the former state of things; of the ruinous competition to which the policy of the mother country had exposed them; and demanded the establishment of a system of measures that should accomplish their favorite purpose of creating a vigorous domestic manufacture. The unrestrained admission of British goods had reduced our manufacturers and artisans to absolute want: the free entry of British shipping had expelled our vessels from the ocean. From Charleston to Boston this condition of things was the subject of one loud and continued remonstrance; and the remedy for it was a prominent object in the establishment of a new general government. The ship-builders and the shipowners complained that foreign bottoms brought to the country all that was imported, to their ruin; and they besought their fellow-citizens to join them in measures of protection. The manufacturers and mechanics declared that it was of little importance to them in what bottoms articles were imported, since this unrestricted importation, in whatever bottoms, threatened to reduce them to starvation. Both had applied to their own state governments for redress, but these governments, from want of concert, could give no effectual relief. Attempts had been made to amend the articles of confederation for the very purpose of conferring this power upon congress; but these attempts had failed. Hence it was that the establishment of the present government was hailed with the utmost enthusiasm and celebrated in the principal cities, by all classes, with manifestations of hope and joy.

The earliest legislation of the new government avows and adopts the principle for which we have been contending. The first important act on the statute book contains the following preamble:—‘Whereas it is necessary for the support of government and *the encouragement and protection of manufactures* that duties be laid on goods and merchandise.’—This preamble was written, supported and passed by those who had come recently from the convention where the Constitution had been formed. They were carrying into effect their own instrument. They seem, indeed,—for preambles are quite unusual,—to have introduced this for the purpose of shewing the country that its expectations would be fulfilled, and that the manufactures of the nation would be protected. If, therefore, the existing laws violate the Constitution, the original act violated it. If this charter of right be marred now, it was marred then, and marred by those who made it.

If protection be unconstitutional, this law carries unconstitutionality in its front; and yet, not one member of the first Congress appears to have thought it unconstitutional. In the whole course of the debates, protracted through several weeks, no one expressed a doubt of the power of Congress

to lay duties for protection ; we may therefore affirm that the power was admitted by all. Some articles were taxed for revenue only ; some for protection only ; and some for both. The published debates show all this, and, as we have already said, every Congress, from that day to this, has recognised the same power. Every President, beginning with him who is justly esteemed the Father of his Country, has sanctioned it, and most of them have recommended its exercise, in earnest terms. Indeed, it has been constantly exercised ; protection has been given by the registry acts ; it has been given by the tonnage duty acts ; it has been given by the acts regulating the coasting trade ; it has been given to the fisheries ; it has been given to the cotton of Carolina ; to the coal of Virginia ; to the hemp of Kentucky ; to the lead of Missouri and Illinois ; to the sugar of Louisiana, to the iron of the middle, western and southern States ; and it has been given to the various artisans, mechanics and manufacturers. It is now forty-two years since this system of protection began, and it has never been intermitted or suspended, with regard to many commodities, for a single hour. Is all this legislation now to be deemed unconstitutional ? Are all these interests to be brought into jeopardy, and perhaps to ruin, upon this modern construction of the constitution ?

Not only has Congress thus constantly exercised this power, but it has thought itself, from the first, under peculiar obligations to exercise it. It has considered that it would be guilty of a plain breach of duty if it should not exercise it ; and so it was declared in its first session. This policy was more earnestly enforced upon Congress because the States had surrendered their whole power on this question, and were, themselves, prohibited from exercising it by the constitution itself ; since as they could not, as separate States, exercise it well, it was taken away from them and vested in the national legislature. It was said, therefore, and said truly, that it would be a fraud upon the States, if Congress, now the sole possessor of the power, should refuse to exercise it. The constitution had declared, that no State should lay any duty except for the mere purpose of enforcing its inspection laws.—Is it conceivable, that the people would agree to deprive their own state governments of the power of protecting manufactures, by suitable regulations of trade, without the consent of Congress, for any other reason than because this power was intentionally transferred to the general Government ? The doctrine now advanced, imputes the strangest absurdity, both to the framers of the constitution and to the people. It supposes them, instead of creating a new remedy for acknowledged evils, to have forever abolished the poor but only remedy which already existed. It supposes, that instead of giving to Congress, as was their avowed design, effectual power to protect manufactures, they did no more than prohibit the States from

exercising that power, and extinguish it as a thing to be deprecated every where and altogether.—It supposes them to have imposed new shackles on their own limbs, and to have surrendered themselves, thus voluntarily bound, to the mercy of their foreign competitors and rivals. We cannot yield our assent to opinions, which ascribe purposes like these, or a policy like this, either to the Convention, or to the people.

It only remains for us to add, that the public judgment has, at all times, affirmed the existence of this power, and approved its exercise. Even at this moment, there is no reason to doubt that nine tenths of all the people hold the power to be constitutional. It is, therefore, not only against the words of the constitution, against the manifest design of the nation in establishing it, against the uniform sense of Congress in passing laws under it, against the practice of forty years, never stayed nor suspended, against the opinion of every tribunal in the country, as far as we are informed; but it is also against the entire conviction of a vast majority of the people themselves, that these new and what we think dangerous opinions, are now brought forward as the true doctrines of the constitution.

It is an error to suppose that the *regulation of commerce* should necessarily imply the denial of a right to restrict, diminish or prohibit any particular branch of it. The *suppression* of any trade, injurious to the community, is as much a national concern, and as valuable an exercise of power, as the *encouragement* of other branches; and, indeed, in practice it must often occur that the conferring of special advantages upon one branch of trade may operate partially to the disadvantage of all others. Such is often the effect of treaties that reserve to the vessels of particular nations free entry to our ports: the commerce with such nations is promoted to the diminution of the trade with others not embraced in the privilege. This, however, is a lawful, just and profitable regulation of commerce. Commerce includes all kinds of traffic, whether sustained upon the ocean in ships, or transported on roads, rivers or canals: whether it belong to the system of domestic exchanges, or is conversant with the occupations of foreign countries; and it is the appropriate function of Congress to regulate it in such manner as their wisdom may dictate, unlimited by any restraints except those which the constitution imposes on the power over the domestic intercourse of the States. The regulation of our commerce with the Indian tribes has subjected the traffic, from time to time, to all such restrictions as the national legislature found it prudent to adopt; and yet this right of regulation has passed unquestioned, though it has been directly exercised to the diminution of any species of traffic that has been considered hurtful.

It is nothing more than a regulation of commerce to shape our policy, in

reference to our intercourse with foreign nations, by such rules as shall increase the products of our own labour to an amount that may render them also the subjects of a foreign trade, and thereby extend our commerce to new regions, and give it new accumulations of commodities. The agricultural products of a nation are not the only elements of its trade; its manufactures may be as desirable to foreign communities, and their transportation and exchange may become fully as valuable foundations of a rapid, enlarged and profitable commerce. Why, then, should the power to regulate commerce be supposed to be arrested at that middle point between the prosecution of an old trade and the commencement of a new one that may, eventually, be rendered more expansive, useful and productive than any other? Such a restraint would seem to be utterly incompatible with the genius and character of any vigorous community, but especially with that of a young and healthy nation.

Before we leave this branch of our inquiry we are anxious to present the constitutional question in one more point of view. The best expositor of the constitution is that instrument itself.

The tenth section of the first article of the constitution provides that "no state shall, *without the consent of Congress*, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws." The limitation which is here set upon the legislation of the states is within the controul of Congress. The *consent* of that body releases any state from the restriction expressed in this clause; and consequently Congress may permit either or all of the states, separately, to levy such duties upon imports as they may think convenient: it may allow the state of South Carolina, for example, to enact a tariff of the highest rates of duties, directed exclusively to the protection of any branch of industry they may wish to foster. It will be observed that the terms of this clause of the constitution absolutely forbid the idea that such a power is to be exercised for revenue. The state that imposes the duty is inhibited from taking the avails into its own treasury, but must pay them over to the general government; whilst that government, on the other hand, has the fullest power to levy and collect its own revenues, and consequently cannot be presumed to yield its consent to the state enactment upon considerations of that nature. That consent, therefore, is intended to be given, if it be ever asked, from a conviction of the beneficial effect expected to be produced in the state that levies the duty—or in other words, of its value as a protection to state labour. With such a power on the part of Congress to permit a protective system to be enacted in the states severally, it would seem to be a solecism to suppose that the exercise of a similar power was intended to be denied to the national legislature itself to whom has been

emphatically entrusted the whole complicated and interesting concern of regulating commerce.

In dismissing this review of the principles and practice of our government in their relation to an important constitutional right, we take the occasion to say that we contemplate the character of the present opposition to what we have endeavoured to exhibit as the legitimate powers of Congress, with regret; and if we could persuade ourselves that it was destined to command the assent of any large portions of our population, we would say that we view it not without alarm. This opposition appeals not to the discretion of Congress; it seeks no modification, nor qualification, but demands an entire and absolute surrender of the principle. It is for the American people to decide whether this surrender can be made. For ourselves, we do not scruple to declare that, in our opinion, to give up this power would be to give up the constitution. If Congress be stripped of this prerogative and the restriction against its exercise be still imposed upon the states, it is quite plain to our apprehension, that the doom of our happy and prosperous constitution is sealed. We consider this question, therefore, as vital; and we look to the perpetuation of the power which we have laboured to defend, and its just exercise, to be indispensable to the preservation of that government which has conferred on the people of these states innumerable blessings.

You are next invited to examine the subject in its connexion with the principles of an enlightened political economy. The system which we maintain rests upon the following principles:

All the means of human enjoyment, and all the accumulations of wealth, are the product of human labour.—National happiness and national wealth are, therefore, promoted in proportion to the active industry of the community; and that industry is in proportion to the inducements to labour, arising from the amount and certainty of its remuneration. The immediate instrument for calling labour into action is capital. Capital is necessary to furnish the labourer with the means of applying his labour to advantage, whether in the simple tools of agriculture and some of the mechanic arts, or in the complicated and expensive machinery, applied to certain branches of manufacture, the modern improvements in which have added so much to the productive power of man.

It is a settled axiom, that the industry of a nation is in proportion to the capital devoted to its maintenance. It is, therefore, thought to be a wise policy to multiply the inducements to apply capital to the employment of labour at home, rather than to the purchase abroad and traffic in commodities of foreign production, by which, the capital of the country is made to set in motion foreign labour. This is founded on the principle, universal-

ly admitted, that there is, in every nation, a power or capability of labour beyond that actually put forth; and that its effective industry is proportioned to the stimulus applied in the shape of capital. This constitutes the American System. It invites the application of American capital to stimulate American industry. It imposes a restriction, in the form of an impost duty, on certain products of *foreign* labour; but so far as relates to *American* capital, or *American* labour, it simply offers security and inducement to the one, and gives energy and vigour to the other. The purpose of the protective system being thus directed to the utmost expansion of the industry of the nation into every channel of domestic competition, it would seem to be manifestly erroneous to call such a system *restrictive*, inasmuch as the avenues of labour in the internal organization of any community are much more numerous and extensive, than those which belong to foreign trade: whilst, on the other hand, there are no restrictions so severe upon the occupation of our citizens, and none that so irresistibly impel labour into a small number of channels as those that are created by the capital and industry of older nations when concentrated and brought into competition with the capital and industry of a young people in their first attempts to possess themselves of the arts that create and accumulate wealth. A nation that is devoted to agriculture only, and is dependent upon foreign labour for its manufactures, presents the spectacle of a people whose industry is confined to the single occupation of cultivating the soil, and transporting its products abroad, and is always subject to be disturbed by the policy of those on whom it depends for the purchase of its products: but the same nation, when encouraged in the attempt to supply itself with manufactured fabrics, releases its labour from the restraints of its previous straitened condition, and is seen rapidly diversifying its pursuits until they finally cover the whole space that was originally divided between itself and the people that supplied it with manufactures.

It is true, that a different system of political economy is maintained by a certain school of theoretical writers. It is contended by them, that restriction upon the importation of foreign commodities, under any circumstances, is a mistaken economy;—that foreign manufacturers should be allowed freely to bring in their wares, although they will receive from us nothing in exchange, but the precious metals. This is the system which has been lately called enlightened. We, on the contrary, believe it to be founded on mistaken views; and that a practical application of it would paralyze the industry of the country. The fundamental principle in this system, is one which we deem totally erroneous. It considers the *profits of capital*, as constituting the only source of national wealth. It assumes the fact, that the *wages of labour* are barely sufficient to support the labourer, but leave him no-

thing for accumulation. Now, whether this may or may not be true, in the fully peopled countries of Europe, it is palpable to the slightest observation, that in reference to labour in the United States it is absolutely and totally false. Such is the abundance of the means of subsistence in this favoured country, that the labourer is able to accumulate capital out of his surplus earnings. We every where see capital accumulating in connexion with labour. Labour is not with us, as the theory supposes, the mere instrument of capital, the mere handmaid to furnish the profits of the capitalist; it is, on the contrary, an intelligent, active principle,—the partner and sharer in the increase of wealth produced by the united action of both. We have no class in America corresponding with the operatives,—the human machines of Europe. We, therefore, totally deny the correctness of the position, that “the question relates exclusively to the *application* of capital.” We deny, that “the power of government is limited to its *transfer* from one employment to another.” By increasing the stimulus to labour, resulting from the application of capital, to home production, additional capital *can* “be generated by an act of legislation.” It is said, that this system “oppresses the many for the benefit of the few.” We, on the contrary, believe, that whilst it benefits all, its highest recommendation is found in its beneficial action upon the many—the labouring classes, the working men. If there is any one principle in political economy, which is perfectly well established, it is, that the profits of capital, employed in any one branch of industry, cannot, for any length of time, exceed the average rate in other employments; it being the constant tendency of free competition to equalize profits. It is, therefore, an argument altogether fallacious to suppose, that this system favours capital devoted to one branch of business more than that devoted to another; or benefits any one class of individuals, to the prejudice or exclusion of others.

It is also said, that “it is equally untrue that such a system gives greater employment to labour.”

We dissent from this doctrine, and are fortified by the opinion of the author of “The Wealth of Nations,” whose language we think it useful to quote: “The capital of the manufacturer,” says this writer, “puts immediately into motion a much greater quantity of productive labour, and adds a much greater value to the land and labour of the society, than an equal capital in the hands of any wholesale merchant.”—“After agriculture, the capital employed in manufactures puts into motion the greatest quantity of productive labour, and adds the greatest value to the annual produce. That which is employed in the trade of exportation has the least effect of any of the three.”—“The capital employed in the home trade of any country will generally give encouragement and support to a greater quantity of produc-

tive labour, in that country, and increase the value of its produce more than an equal capital employed in the foreign trade of consumption, and the capital employed in this latter trade has, in both these respects, a still greater advantage over an equal capital employed in the carrying trade." "That part of the capital of any country which is employed in the carrying trade is altogether withdrawn from supporting the productive labour of that particular country to support that of some foreign countries."

In accordance with these positions, we maintain the efficiency of labour to add to the power and riches of a country, against the theories of later writers who attribute every thing to capital. In fact, we consider it the most important and valuable feature in our system, that it tends directly to increase the effective power and remuneration of labour, thus multiplying the means, the comforts and enjoyments, of the labouring classes, and raising them in the scale of civilization and social life. This political effect on the character of society may be considered its highest recommendation. It is thus made to give strength and permanency to our free institutions.

The peculiar advantage of the United States consists in the abundance and cheapness of fertile lands, affording an easy subsistence and high remuneration to labour.—We consider the system of establishing manufactures and the arts amongst us, as distributing and equalizing these peculiar advantages, through all the departments of industry and through all classes of society.

This effect, we believe, to be deducible from the system, according to the most approved principles of political economy. But we consider all speculation on this subject, founded on the ultimate tendencies of human action and the averages of contending principles, as very uncertain guides in legislation, compared to the surer test of experience, and those practical results which are obvious to the senses.

Mistaken and preposterous assumptions of the merits of what is called Free Trade have, under the ever active delusion of British influence, afforded pretexts latterly to the opponents of the protective system, which it is proper to dispel. It is not long since no one believed in the power of propelling boats by steam, and every one believed that the British debt was to be paid off by the sinking fund;—similar mistakes exist as to Free Trade—As a municipal principle, there is no question of the great advantages of Free Trade. The United States, in their coasting trade and domestic exchanges, afford the most striking illustrations of them ever witnessed—but, as between foreign nations, there is no free trade—there never was—there never can be—It would contravene the arrangements of Providence, which distribute mankind into different communities, separated originally by confusion of tongues, and prevented from all rushing together into the most fa-

vored latitudes, by local attachments and foreign antipathies, which are the germs of national preservation, by means of national emulation.

Much of the suffering which it is alleged is felt in certain portions of the United States (if their complaints have, in fact, any foundation) is to be attributed to the very circumstance that they are placed in the circle of twenty-four commonwealths, enjoying the most complete freedom of trade, the operation of which has been to expose those who have not the inclination to employ their labour to the full extent of its capacity, to the severe rivalry of more industrious and thrifty communities, living under the protection of the same general government.

Nations are adversary to each other; their commercial intercourse is regulated by treaties always made with a view to relative advantages, and to provide for those hostilities which are of perpetual recurrence. The vexatious provincial tariffs which formerly fettered intercourse and almost destroyed traffic in the interior of nations, suggested the idea of that free trade, which has since been misunderstood and egregiously misapplied by mere speculative writers—The tariff acts, which even now impose duties on the wines of Spain at provincial borders and on those of France at city gates, are grievances, for which free trade is a happy substitute—but the principle is entirely municipal and in no respect applicable, without disadvantage, to independent nations.—The vessels of the United States are navigated with fewer hands and make their voyages in shorter periods, than others;—hence, what is called the reciprocity principle, originating in the first treaty between the United States and France, has been wisely proffered by the United States to many other nations, because it is supposed that our navigation would supplant theirs.—But the artificial systems of England, France, Spain and the other nations with which the United States have most intercourse, render it extremely improbable that any approximation to the footing of free trade should ever be arranged between them, even by treaty. For us to attempt while they reject it, would be a complete surrender of ourselves as a voluntary sacrifice to the policy and cupidity of foreign governments; to create a government for the benefit of others and not for ourselves. A tariff of duties on commerce between New-York and New-Jersey would be as injurious as unconstitutional. Free trade between these states and among all the states of the Union is the main spring of general welfare—and one of the strongest links of the chain that connects them; but free trade between New-York and Liverpool would ruin the farmers of England through our superabundant bread-stuffs, and the manufacturers of the United States by the superior capital and proficiency of England in manufactures, and the degraded state of the operatives. An unrestricted intercourse between two nations reduces the labour of one to the same scale of compen-

sation with the labour of the other; and such a consequence is certainly to be deprecated by that nation whose labour stood highest on the scale. This consideration forms a striking argument against the policy of such a system between foreign states.—While, on the other hand, it is no less desirable that, amongst the separate communities associated under the same government, this reduction of the higher labour to the scale of the lower should take place, inasmuch as the interests of these domestic communities are equally the objects of the protection and solicitude of their common governors.

The freest of free trade is, after all, but a chartered libertine.—The United States could not share their coasting trade with England without disadvantage:—the most extravagant advocates of free trade (it is believed) have never yet dreamed of sharing our river trade with foreigners.—To throw open the Ohio and Mississippi, the Hudson and the Delaware to British, French and Dutch navigation, would be of no advantage to our own.—England could not open her maritime coal trade, the great nursery of her seamen, to the enterprise of New England without losing at least one half of it.—She even refuses us a passage through the St. Lawrence, although we own part of that river. The greatest commercial nations of the middle ages, the Hanseatic League, and Holland, the maritime wonder of the world, became such by the exclusive enjoyment of the fisheries and the trade to India and other monopolies, which they maintained at the charge of long and bloody wars.—England struck the vital blow at Holland, not so much by naval victories as by her navigation act. The commercial and the military marine of the United States have risen to eminence upon similar interdiction.—With free trade we should have neither the one nor the other, but be a poor, dependent, pastoral people—It is only about ten years since a project for reducing the duties was first suggested in England, in a petition to Parliament from the merchants and traders of London.—In 1825 some slight and cautious reductions were accordingly made, but in nothing to affect the commercial monopoly and maritime ascendancy of Great Britain. Her colonial commerce is mostly exclusive.—The freedom of the trade of the Susquehanna river is now in dispute between the states of Maryland, Pennsylvania and New-York. So intractable is free trade in fact, while fruitful of speculation. Within a few years Russia, misled by this delusion, and Holland under the influence of England, made experiments of free trade, which Russia soon found intolerable and abandoned, and which has contributed to reducing Holland from once being the richest nation of Europe to being one of the most impoverished and indebted. In fine, the dogmas of free trade, which are said to be taught in some colleges, may serve to inflame youthful imaginations, but, as they have never actuated a practical statesman, they can never mislead any well-informed mind. What is

called the American System, is the system of Europe; is the universal system;—and (if the experience and common sense of mankind be any standard of right) is the true and the only system of intercourse among nations.

It is doubtless true, that during the last half century, a more enlightened philosophy has been applied to the affairs of mankind; that political economy is much better understood, its principles more fully developed, and more judiciously applied. The sense and experience of men had gone far to correct the erroneous legislation of former times, and to develop and multiply the true sources of national wealth. But the modern theory is not content with the attainment of practical benefits merely; it seeks, by an unqualified application of certain general principles, to produce a thorough revolution in the business of men and the relations of nations. It is against these extremes of visionary good and practical mischief, that we desire all men of reflection and sober judgment to make a stand. We ask them to look at the present condition of our country and to examine the operation of the present system upon all its great interests. Above all, we ask them to look to the practice of all foreign nations, rather than to the speculations of their writers. They will then find that those who have taught us this theory of free trade, are too wise to practise it; that they continue to act and to legislate upon the system of protecting their own industry, though some of their writers and orators recommend to all other nations to abandon it.

A reference to our own experience is, however, the best criterion, by which to test the correctness of the system which we support. It is not new; the principle was applied, as we have already stated, to our navigation, from the establishment of the Federal constitution, prohibiting foreign shipping from the coasting trade altogether, and imposing a high discriminating duty on foreign tonnage. If this discrimination has been abandoned, in respect to those nations, who would consent to a system of reciprocity, it involves no surrender of the principle. Trade can only be carried on between nations by mutual agreement; and mutual protection leads to reciprocity as the only equitable arrangement. The mechanic arts have also been the subject of protection from the establishment of the government; and it cannot be doubted that to this circumstance they owe, in a great measure, their success; a success, which has made the mechanics of the United States one of the main pillars of our national strength. Agriculture has likewise had a full share of the benefit of this protection; and in truth it may be said, that as our government commenced its career with the establishment of the germs of the protective system, so it has continued ever since, gradually nurturing and invigorating them until they have reached their present growth. Some interruptions have occurred in the march of this policy, but these interruptions owe their origin to accidental circumstances which dic-

tated the necessity of relaxing the system for the benefit of other interests that were more immediately concerned in availing themselves of the advantages of foreign trade. These, however, are to be regarded not as proofs of the uselessness of the system, but as exceptions growing out of the pressure of temporary accidents. The events that followed the French revolution gave a new and unexpected direction to the enterprise of our citizens. The disturbed state of the continent of Europe, and the prevalence of universal wars, throughout the nations of that quarter of the globe, placed the United States in the position of the only neutral amongst many belligerents, and so obviously opened the way to commercial wealth to our citizens, that all other interests sank into insignificance compared with those which were concerned in pushing a foreign commerce into every region where the strife of the contending parties excluded the competition of the belligerents themselves, and left to the United States the undisputed monopoly of trade. To this fortunate conjuncture of circumstances is to be ascribed the most rapid growth that has ever been traced in the history of any empire. The United States not only became the medium of the commerce of the world, but their peaceful position attracted the emigration of all those who had the means and the wish to escape from European troubles.

Amongst the advantages which have resulted to us from this state of things we have suffered one evil, the effect of which is not obliterated, even at this day. Accustomed for twelve or fourteen years to commercial speculations of unparalleled activity and success, we were taught to think that our national prosperity was inseparably connected with the prosecution of that kind of trade in which our citizens had been engaged, and we were thus insensibly educated in the opinion that the great interests of our commonwealth would be always concerned with a foreign commerce exclusively employed in transporting abroad the products of our agriculture and receiving returns in the manufactured commodities of other nations.

There was another circumstance that gave great authority to this delusion. The cotton manufacture of Great Britain was rapidly arising into the greatest activity and vigour. It was in process of time discovered that the raw material for this manufacture could be produced in the United States under more favourable circumstances than in any other part of the world. At first, but two or three of our states were employed in the cultivation, and the demand from England was even greater than the supply. The profits of this cultivation, therefore, were almost unlimited. The portions of territory employed in the growing of cotton were small, and the common opinion was that but few districts, in comparison with the great extent of our surface, could be appropriated to the culture. In the meantime, the cotton fabrics were diffused over Europe and took the place of large quantities of

those manufactured from wool, silk and flax. Every year demonstrated the increasing importance of this manufacture both in Europe and America, and the demand still continued to outrun the supply. These circumstances had their influence in impressing upon our citizens an exaggerated idea of the permanence and value of this source of agricultural wealth and, along with it, the value of the trade which was concerned in the transportation of it. It persuaded our planters to believe that they possessed an almost inexhaustible source of riches: it unfitted them for sober calculations upon the effects that would follow the extension of the culture of cotton over the fertile regions that yet lay in wilderness behind them: and it equally disinclined them to foresee the possibility of the manufacture itself reaching a term at which it might become stationary and which was, therefore, eventually to set a limit upon the demand, at the very period when the supply would be increased in an almost infinite ratio by the spread of population over other states of our union, even more propitious than their own to the production of the plant. It may, therefore, be considered a misfortune, consequent upon their former prosperity, that our citizens were almost irresistibly led by it into delusive estimates of the true and permanent sources of national wealth. It was one result of this state of things that, whilst our countrymen were intent upon gathering the harvest which the distracted condition of the world had strewn before them, they were unmindful of the future and neglected to treasure up the elements of strength and prosperity which lay hidden in the bosom of the nation; and which, as they were independent of foreign legislation or external accidents, were most likely to furnish the means of a stable and enduring happiness.

Troubles soon afterwards broke out at home. A war threatened and our citizens were suddenly called to meet a tremendous emergency. Our commerce was put in fetters by non-importation acts and embargoes; and the crisis that succeeded found us without the most ordinary resources of an independent people. Our armies went to the frontier clothed in the fabrics of the enemy; our munitions of war were gathered as chance supplied them from the four quarters of the earth; and the whole struggle was marked by the prodigality, waste and privation of a thriftless nation, taken at unawares and challenged to a contest without the necessary armour of a combatant.

When it pleased Heaven to rescue us from the imminent hazards of this doubtful and disproportioned conflict, we saw around us a nation of eight millions of people possessed of a territory nearly equal to the continent of Europe, rich in the ungathered resources of every kind of wealth,—just emerging from a war of two years and a half, with an enemy who had never assembled an army of more than thirty thousand men—and yet deranged

in all its channels of industry, exhausted, and on the verge of bankruptcy. Nothing but the most perverse neglect of the fundamental precepts connected with the proper administration of the concerns of a commonwealth could have produced such a result!

These disasters opened our eyes to some important facts. They demonstrated to us the necessity of extending more efficient protection, at least, to those manufactures which were essential to the defence of the nation. They proved to us the value of a national currency, and the duty of protecting it from the influence of foreign disturbance: and, amongst other things of equal moment, they made us acquainted with the fact that the British manufacturers could find a large and, if necessary, a complete supply of cotton from other soils than our own.

All these matters came into review before Congress at the close of the war. A proper occasion for their discussion arose when the question was submitted as to the reduction of the war duties. The return of peace made it necessary for the legislature to take off the taxes that had been imposed for defraying the expenses of the war; and in this reduction of duties to what it was considered should be a permanent standard, the cotton planting interest urged with great force and propriety, the necessity of retaining such a duty as should exclude from the American market all fabrics made from the cotton of the East Indies. It was an anomaly apparent to every citizen of the United States, that our government, possessing so many facilities for supplying Europe with cotton, should, nevertheless, allow a trade that threw in upon us vast quantities of cotton cloth produced at the distance of ten thousand miles: that our most common household supplies should be furnished from such a quarter. Nothing was more generally acknowledged than the duty of the government to protect the cotton grower against such a competition; and this argument was addressed to the nation by the cotton growing states, even with the conviction, at that time prevalent amongst themselves, that its success would be to give them what may be termed a species of monopoly in the supply.

The duty was retained; and it is important to know that, being designed for the protection of the cotton grower, it was graduated to a scale precisely adequate to that purpose. *His* interest required the exclusion of the East India fabric, but was supposed to be hostile to the attempt of the American citizen to manufacture the material: the duty, therefore, was adapted to the first purpose, but not to the latter. It banished the foreign manufacture:—it did not protect the home;—being thus accurately adjusted to the wants and wishes of the planting interest, without professing to serve any other.

This placed our commerce upon the most favourable footing for the cot-

ton grower that could be desired; and the nation, having thus performed its duty to this valuable interest, turned its attention to other branches of industry.

The Tariff of 1816, it may be remarked, was a measure that met the approbation of the large majority of the people in every section of the union. No partial nor local considerations were embodied against the operation of either its principles or policy. The southern states were even more forward than their northern confederates in recommending the policy and defending it in the councils of the nation. By this tariff various manufactures were attempted to be established in the United States. The want of skill and capital exposed these infant institutions to a fierce and vindictive competition from the manufacturers of Great Britain; and, in three years, almost every capitalist who had ventured into this field of enterprise was broken up. The heavy loss and distress that visited this endeavour to establish manufactures subsequently urged the subject of more extended protection upon Congress, and the result, after various struggles, close and elaborate inquiry and a careful attention to the expanding means of the country, was the establishment of a vigorous system, which has diffused health and strength into the industry of the nation, and added to the wealth of every class of the community.

We ask attention to another topic. Revulsions in trade are unavoidable: the balance of supply and demand cannot always be regulated with precision. There is a tendency, growing out of a prosperous commerce, to push success to an extreme which produces reaction. To these periods of embarrassment, of general stagnation, and severe pressure for money, the United States have been peculiarly subject.—We attribute this, in a great measure, to our having depended, in so great a degree, for our manufactures, upon the nations of Europe. Importation is induced more frequently by the necessity or hope of the manufacturer to find a market, than by actual reference to the wants or means of the country. A reduction in the prices of exports, following an excessive importation, causes a state of exchange which leads to an exportation of specie; the moment this exportation touches that portion of the precious metals necessary to sustain the money circulation, the operations of the banks become embarrassed, and distress and dismay are spread through all classes of the community.

We believe that the system which furnishes a nation with manufactures, essential to its daily wants, from its own industry, is the best possible security against violent changes in its currency;—changes which paralyze all industry, and disturb all trade; and we therefore submit it to the experience and judgment of the American people whether the protective system is not, in this particular, more advantageous to the country than that which,

after deluging our markets with foreign manufactures, draws from us, in return, not a useless commodity, but the instrument by which our exchanges are performed, the very basis of our bank circulation, the essential principle of commercial confidence.

Mistaken opinions in regard to the effect of the tariff upon the prices of commodities used in the United States and upon which the protective system has been brought to bear, have furnished some popular objections against the wisdom of the policy. It has been said that the effect of a duty is necessarily to increase the price of any article upon which it is laid to the full amount of the tax. It would be easy to show, by a minute survey of the whole field of American industry, that, so far from this being true, the invariable operation of the tariff has been to lower the price to the consumer of every article that has been successfully manufactured under the protection. Such a survey would require more detail than the purpose of this address allows, but we propose to examine the operation of the tariff upon some of our most important staples.

In the article of cotton it is admitted that our manufacture has arrived at such perfection in the production of the coarse fabrics, that they are not only furnished at little more than one half of the cost which the imported articles of the same kind bore a few years ago, but they are produced as cheaply at the present time as our foreign rivals, under all the excitements of American competition, are able to furnish them. They have had a constant and increasing demand for several years for exportation as well as for home consumption. None but the finer qualities are now imported, which are little, if at all affected by the minimum duty. The price of raw cotton has fallen but about a cent a pound within the last four years, whilst the price of cotton goods,—of sheetings, for instance, of more than three yards to the pound,—has fallen nearly four cents a yard within the same period. Satinets, of wool and cotton, are made at less than one half the price of cassimeres, and are more durable. Cotton flannels formerly imported from China at from fifty to sixty cents a yard, are now made, of a better quality, here, at from fifteen to twenty cents. Indeed we might enumerate every species of manufacture in which this material enters as a component part, to show that both in the character of the article and the cheapness of its price, the country has been a great gainer since the enactment of the system that has promoted its fabrication.

To the cotton planters of the United States, the system has undoubtedly yielded the most decisive advantages. It has created a certain and valuable market for about one-fifth of their crop, and it has encouraged the consumption of large quantities of their staple in fabrics to which it never would have been applied, if the manufacture had not been carried on in

our own country. The establishment of cotton mills amongst us has had the most visible tendency to induce our manufacturers to apply cotton to uses which both the policy and the position of foreign manufacturers would have forever forbidden them from adopting. This fact is conspicuously seen in the application of cotton to sail cloth, and to all those articles of heavy clothing in which it has lately been substituted for wool. It is now manufactured into carpets, blankets, cordage, twine, net work and a variety of other commodities that may be said to be exclusively of American origin. Cotton being a product of our own soil, we have naturally an interest to extend its application to new uses, above what might be expected from nations who are mere purchasers of the article, and who are as much, if not more, concerned in preserving and promoting the use of wool and hemp in the fabrics to which we have applied our cotton.

Let us next consider the article of Iron; and we will introduce the notice of it with a quotation from that masterly report of the first Secretary of the Treasury, which, forty years ago, recommended prohibitory duties in favor of the manufacturers of this article: "for" says that report, "they are entitled to pre-eminent rank. None are more essential in their kinds, none so extensive in their uses. They constitute, in whole or in part, the implements or the materials, or both, of almost every useful occupation. Their instrumentality is every where conspicuous. It is fortunate for the United States that they have peculiar advantages, for deriving the full benefit, of this most valuable material, and they have every motive to improve it with systematic care. It is to be found in various parts of the United States in great abundance, and of almost every quality; and fuel, the chief instrument in manufacturing it, is both cheap and plenty." This report which is a treatise on Political Economy, at least equal to any thing that has appeared since its publication, states that the average price of Iron before the revolution, was about sixty-four dollars per ton, and that at the time of that report it was about eighty dollars. Soon after it appears to have risen to ninety-five dollars, and in 1814 was as high as one hundred and fifty dollars. After the ineffectual Tariff of 1818, which ruined numbers, induced by its vain protection to make investments in the manufacture of iron, it rose from ninety to one hundred and five dollars per ton. Under the influence of the duties of the acts of 1824 and 1828, it has declined to its present prices of from seventy-five to eighty-five dollars per ton, and there is every reason for the confident belief entertained, that if our own market be protected against the formidable and incessant endeavours of the British manufacturers to controul it, the price of iron will, before long, decline to from fifty to sixty dollars per ton. Such is the irrefutable proof of all recent experience.—Cut nails, which in 1816 sold for twelve cents

per lb. are now sold for less than half that sum, under the permanent security of five cents per lb. which has given our manufacturers their own market. "The United States, (says Hamilton's report before mentioned) "already in great measure supply themselves with nails. About one million eight hundred thousand pounds of nails and spikes were imported into the United States," in the course of the year ending the 4th of September 1790. A duty of two cents per lb, would, it is presumable, speedily "put an end to so considerable an importation. And it is in every view proper that an end should be put to it."

Bar Iron which sold at Pittsburg in 1829 at \$122, sells there now at \$95. Castings which were \$63 are now \$50 per ton. Such are the practical results, proving the operation of the tariffs on the market for iron. The duty, by the law of 1816, was so inadequate as to cause nothing but ruin to those concerned and enhancement of price to the consumer. The act of 1818 was some amelioration; the acts of 1824 and 1828, which increased the duty, decreased the price. Hammered bar iron under a duty of twenty two dollars and forty cents a ton; is at a lower price than when under a duty of nine dollars a ton, and improved in quality from five to ten per cent. by the greater care and skill which more extensive investment has naturally created under more certain protection.—The efforts of the English manufacturers to destroy the American manufacture of iron, and possess themselves of our market, have occasioned extensive bankruptcies amongst them in England, and reduced the price of iron considerably below the cost of manufacture; insomuch that a convention of iron manufacturers, recently held there, resolved to reduce the quantity made twenty per cent. throughout the United Kingdoms. With the controul of our market they would infallibly regulate both the price and the quantity of the iron in this country—thirty-one establishments of which have appeared in Western Pennsylvania alone, since the last Tariff act.

The influence of protection upon wool, while it has been most beneficial upon the farming states, has had no tendency, that we are aware of, to injure the plantation states. The number of sheep in the United States is computed at about twenty millions: And their increase at about five millions since the act of 1828, which gave a great impulse to the stock. The farmers of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Ohio, New-York and the other wool-growing states, have an interest in this national property, taken at fifty-five cents per lb., nearly equal to the capital of the plantation states in the cotton crop of this year, reckoning it at thirty millions of dollars. There is no doubt that, within three years to come, the farming capital in wool will be more valuable than the plantation capital in cotton. Without protect-

ing duties American wool would be reduced one-half in quantity and in price. The large flocks which now cover the immense and inexhaustible pastures of the United States, most of them more or less of the fine Spanish breeds, must be again slaughtered, as has been heretofore the case, for want of due protection, and this great capital in fleece sacrificed to that of cotton with enormous loss to one interest, and with no possible advantage to the other. For like every thing else, woollen goods have fallen from twenty to twenty-five per cent. since the last tariff. The immediate effect of that act, by calling a large number of additional clothiers into active enterprise, was to cause a decline in prices ruinous to many of those before engaged in the occupation. Under the influence of the improvement in the price of wool, woollen manufacturers have rallied again, but, at least as respects them, the charge of monopolizing prices is a cruel mockery. The advantages of the Tariff, in its operation upon wool, have thus far been confined almost exclusively to the farming interest; the manufacturers have yet all their way to win, and the effect of that competition, which is the result of protection, cannot be known until it has had longer time for operation.

The finest cotton and woollen manufactures are not yet much made in the United States, but we may assert without fear of contradiction that nine-tenths of the American people, who do not affect foreign luxuries and fashions, may be clothed with woollen, cotton, fur and leather fabrics of their own country, better and cheaper, than either could have been obtained abroad if the tariff had never been enacted. The greatest mistakes prevail in this respect; it is continually said, that hats, coats, boots and other articles of dress are dearer here than elsewhere. Such is not the case with all those who are independent of foreign fashions. Those who enjoy superior wealth and study superior elegance, are at liberty to gratify their caprice, at that additional expense, which such a gratification costs in all countries—in none more than in Great Britain, where the opulent and noble are in the habit of paying more extravagantly for French, Asiatic and other luxuries, than some of our opulent citizens chuse to pay, in like manner, for luxuries imported from abroad.

Whilst we assert that it has been the effect of the protective system to benefit the consumers by giving them manufactures cheaper than they had them before, we are willing to admit that prices have had a correspondent fall in the same articles abroad; but this fall of price abroad has been the result of the competition of American labour. It is impossible to advert to the fact that the United States export to foreign markets six times the quantity of domestic manufactures that they exported in 1820, and at present furnish incomparably the largest share of the home demand, with-

but perceiving the tendency of such a competition to reduce the price of the same articles amongst all those nations who aim at supplying us.

But we hold it to be a common error to consider the comparative cheapness of the foreign and domestic commodity a test of the value of the system. Even if it were true that the domestic product were not reduced in price, and were to be procured only at a higher cost than the foreign, still the benefit of the system would be found in the fact that it enables the domestic consumer to afford the higher price for the manufacture, and thereby to furnish himself on better terms than he could have done when obliged to depend upon the foreign imported commodity—that, in other words, the increase of price, if it has taken place, cannot be called a tax upon the consumer, if the same system which has increased the price has also increased his means of paying it. That this increased ability to pay has occurred to a most beneficial extent, is evident in the invigorated condition of our agriculture in the last three or four years, during which period the value of the labour of the farmer, and with it the value of his land, it is well known, has risen some twenty or thirty per cent. This augmentation in the value of agricultural labour and capital can be ascribed to no other cause than to the increase of the manufacturing classes, and to the rapid growth of our home market under the protective system. During this period there have been no wars to create a demand abroad for our grain, but on the contrary, all the producing nations have been exerting their industry to the utmost, and maintaining a rivalry against our own citizens which would have visited them with the most disastrous consequences if they had not found a steady and valuable market at home. The fact, too, that agricultural products have risen whilst manufactured goods have fallen, furnish the best proofs that the fall of prices are to be mainly attributable to the competition of domestic labour.

The loudest complaints of oppression proceed from the South, particularly from South Carolina; but that these complaints are not owing to the tariff acts, is unquestionably proved by the fact, that their public press, their memorials to Congress, and other mediums of complaint, were as much burthened with them before those acts, as they have been since. In the acquisition of the extensive and fertile territories annexed to the United States by the purchase of Louisiana the lands and property of the plantation states could not fail to be depreciated, by a vast accession of lands, at least as fertile, for all similar purposes. But it is inconceivable how a steady market for at least two hundred thousand bales of cotton a year, liable to no fluctuation from foreign influence, can be injurious to the cotton growing states; and, certainly, if the inhabitants of the less exuberant and more industrious latitudes of the central and eastern states, were not,

from the influence of climate, or some other cause, less liable to excitement and less addicted to complain than their southern brethren, they have had much greater cause for it.

The article of sugar is a production of the planting states receiving the full benefit of the protecting system. If any application of the system operate as a tax on consumption, it would apply to the duty on sugar. It is true, the cotton planters of South Carolina will not admit that protection to the cultivation of sugar is any offset to their own fancied oppressions; but it is apparent that the lands and capital devoted to the cultivation of the sugar cane, are so much of both withdrawn from the cultivation of cotton, relieving that culture from the effect of over production, the only evil which it has any reason to fear.

The bread stuffs, lumber, and nearly all the other staples of all the grain growing states are excluded from European markets by prohibitory duties. Whilst the export of cotton has quadrupled, that of breadstuffs has diminished in a much greater ratio with relation to the population of the states that produce them. If instead of spending their time in unavailing complaints, they had not conformed to circumstances, and turned their attention to manufactures, *their* grievances would have been infinitely greater than any of which the southern states have ever complained. Nothing could relieve the farming interests of the middle states but their own manufactures and the manufactures of the eastern states. They alone supply that market which Europe denies. In addition to the incalculable consumption of breadstuffs by the manufacturers of the grain-growing states, what is equivalent to a million of barrels of their breadstuffs is imported every year into the eastern states; a relief, without which, the susceptibility of these states would have been tried to a degree of endurance far beyond that exacted from their brethren of the south. It cannot escape observation, that while their sufferings are announced in most eloquent language, and in unintermitting remonstrance, yet there has been so little specification of the supposed causes, that it is denied by many, among themselves, that they suffer at all. There is even good reason to believe, that within the last five years, the interest on planting capital has been more productive to the owner, than the interest on the same amount of capital employed in manufactures.

The states of New-York, Pennsylvania and Ohio have invested a capital of enormous amount, which may be reckoned as at least fifty millions, within the last ten years, in what are called internal improvements, canals, rail-ways, and other facilities of transportation. This capital depends entirely upon domestic industry for its fruits. It would be a dead loss to the four millions of people who have expended it, and might as well be aban-

done at once, without the protected products of domestic industry for its returns. Foreign commerce can yield it little or no service; and to destroy those guards which secure to it the home market, would be to render it altogether a useless expenditure. Foreign commerce would in this way lose also one of its most productive resources.

In our review of the operation of the tariff upon the various interests of the several states, it must never be lost sight of, that the one-fifth of the cotton crop which is consumed at home, for which we may estimate the sum paid at six millions of dollars, is, in the course of a very short time, worked up by manufacture to at least thirty millions of dollars, which is the worth of the raw material wrought into the various articles produced by manipulation: thus one-fifth of the crop of cotton manufactured becomes as valuable as the whole cotton crop, in the short space of six months after its purchase; and in the meantime diffuses competency and comfort amongst large numbers of the labouring classes of the community.

The policy of the protective system is happily and amply illustrated in the growth and prosperity of the United States. The union teems with proofs of its wisdom. All that Hamilton's masterly report predicted of its benefits, has been unfolded and is progressive beyond the most sanguine anticipation. All the objections refuted in his argument have disappeared in experience. The antagonists of the system not long since declared that it would infallibly diminish, if not destroy the revenue, and compel a resort to loans and taxes for the support of government: their present complaint is that the revenue is excessive. Redundant importations, some years ago, imposed the necessity of a loan; the manufacturing establishments now spreading throughout the United States, sustain their agriculture, have revived their commerce, have vastly increased their coasting trade and domestic exchanges, and have mainly contributed to an abundance of the precious metals; they are the stablest pledges of independence and permanent peace, and the most accessible objects of taxation and productive resources in case of need. It was said that high duties would demoralize the commercial character of the United States, and the evils of smuggling were still insisted on and depicted in the most prominent colours. We know of no smuggling; nor do we believe that it exists to any considerable extent. It is true, frauds have been practised upon the revenue laws to a degree that demands the notice of government; but we are happy to have this opportunity to bear testimony to the high and honourable character of our merchants, and to say that where frauds have been discovered they have had their origin with those who are alien to our clime, our laws, and all the considerations connected with our welfare. They are frauds that affect, comparatively, but a small portion of that vast amount of labour that owes its support to the protective system.

It was affirmed that this system would undermine commerce and ruin navigation; but they flourish and prosper beyond all expectation. It was to create a monied aristocracy: if aristocracy be possible with our institutions, it certainly has not found an abiding place amongst manufacturers. It was to inflict a class of paupers upon our population: no such class exists amongst the industrious. It is still denounced as taxing the many for the benefit of the few: but the many, with the power in their hands to change it, are its sturdy friends and supporters, proving that they, at least, deem themselves gainers by the system; whilst the few, on the other hand, never cease to tell us of the grievance of being subject to the majority.

A rapid increase of population, dwellings, culture, of the comforts of life and of the value of property, wherever manufactures prevail, bespeak their capacity to diffuse happiness and wealth. The new industry that has been brought into existence has induced the consumption of increased amounts of the productions of the land, and has added to the prosperity of every class of agriculturists. During the last six years; under the benefit of protection, four hundred sugar plantations have been added to the three hundred previously existing in the state of Louisiana, which now supplies two thirds of the demand of the whole union. In the meantime, the price has been continually falling, and there is every reason to believe that, within a short period, besides furnishing the home market, our planters will have a surplus for exportation.

Our warehouses, workshops, and stores, abound with excellent and elegant wares of American fabrication, almost excluding those from abroad. Silver and plated ware, the richest glassware, porcelain, household furniture and pleasure carriages, every article of woollen and cotton clothing, copper, brass and tin wares, hardwares, arms of all sorts, saddlery, and every thing else made of leather, drugs, paints and oils, tools, utensils, and implements of all sorts, every kind of machinery, from the smallest instrument of cutlery to a steam engine; nearly every thing that can be made of wood, iron, wool, cotton, glass, furs, the precious metals, whatever ministers to comfort, and most of the luxuries; all the substantial and ornamental means of habitation, subsistence, transportation by land and water, clothing and defence, are to be seen in every street, of every town, in every stage of process and transition, from the raw materials, which are abundant and excellent, to the removal of the finished article to distant places of purchase. The principal commerce among the several States of the Union is employed in the transportation of domestic manufactures, and managed by domestic exchanges, which have increased above all computation within the last few years. They insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, and promote the general welfare, by bonds stronger than any

political ties ; infinitely stronger than armies or navies. Protection to these resources is, as it were, the Providence of our political being, ever guarding the industrious citizen, while adding to the nation's wealth. Without that Providence not a labourer, not an artizan, whatever his calling, but would be straitened and brought to ruin. Distress would be intense and universal. Stop the loom and the plough would work in vain; the ship would be unfreighted, and universal stagnation would succeed to the present healthful activity of our land. Is there an American who would raise his ruthless hand against the system which prevents such a calamity? who would recolonize his country from an unnatural disgust for its own productions, and morbid preference for those of Europe? who would bow before the woolsack of England, but spurn the golden fleece of his own soil?

Aversion to manufactures has engendered, of late, bitter local prejudices in parts of those states in which they do not flourish. Not long ago their promotion was in universal favour. When the venerable survivor of the framers of the constitution took the oath of fidelity to it, on commencing his illustrious presidency, the whole nation thought that he proved his patriotism by being clothed in a suit of American broadcloth. To doubt the constitutionality of protecting manufactures was not then conceived. Even to question the policy of promoting them was limited to very few. The statesmen and the patriots of the south were among the foremost to vindicate both.

The general pacification of 1815 exposed our market to the overwhelming force of English capital and skill, with more fearful odds than we had to contend against in the hostilities then closed with Great Britain. The inflexibility of her restrictive system, and the exuberant resources of our own country for manufactures, alone enabled us to withstand the great influx of her fabrics, and constrained us to protect our market by that system which has led to our present prosperity. Is it the cotton growing states who would subvert this prosperity and lay us once more prostrate before the power of our rival? Those states who, for the article of cotton, enjoyed a duty which did not merely *promote* but absolutely *created* its culture? a tax upon all the other states, which was represented as a grievance by the report of the Secretary of the Treasury in the very infancy of our government? a tax which diverted labour and capital into new channels for the exclusive benefit of those states, at the expense of all the rest? a tax which had not the remotest connexion with the revenues of the country, but was imposed merely for protection? Is it, above all others, the state of South Carolina that can complain of a protective impost, while she enjoys a heavy duty on indigo, which she has ceased to produce, and which therefore all the manufacturing states pay under circumstances aggravated by the

fact, that while they are obliged to submit to this tax on an article indispensable to their manufactures, the very state, for whose benefit it was imposed, declines to cultivate the article?

By a special resolution of this convention, an inquiry was directed into the moral influence of our manufactures;—in compliance with which we feel authorized to say, in a word, that the imputations sometimes cast upon the morals of manufacturing communities have proved, according to the experience of this country, to be without the slightest foundation. On the contrary, it is believed that the moral and religious education of those employed in manufactures is, at least, equal, if not superior, to that of other classes of the community.

In concluding this address we would take occasion to observe that the present posture of the affairs of the United States impress upon us the necessity of declaring what we believe to be the sentiment of the friends of American industry, in reference to a great question which must, in a short time, occupy the attention of Congress. Up to this period, the revenue of the government has not exceeded its wants. The debt has required a system of duties that would supply at least ten millions of dollars every year towards its extinguishment. That debt, under the present course of liquidation, will soon cease to exist. The nation will then naturally expect some reduction of duties. Participating in the common feeling on this subject, we cannot close this address without respectfully submitting to public consideration the expediency of applying that reduction to such commodities as are incapable of being brought within the scope of the protective system; holding it, as we do, to be indispensable to the best interests of the American people that that system should be sustained and preserved, without diminution, in its application to every branch of domestic industry that may be benefited by its influence.

Thus, fellow-citizens, we have submitted to your consideration our views of the construction of the constitution upon the great question of protection. If it be the true one, you will sanction and sustain it: if it be otherwise, let it be rejected; for the constitution is the supreme law.

We have also submitted our view of the true policy of this country. We have stated and urged those principles, on which the system of protection rests, which we believe to be supported by the maxims of a sound philosophy, the experience of mankind and our own. It remains with you to determine, whether that system of protecting your own industry, under which you have long advanced and are now prospering, shall be continued or abandoned; whether you will hold fast to that which your experience has proved to be good, or yield yourselves the victims of rash and untried theory. That nearly five hundred of your fellow-citizens should con-

vene, from sections of the country more than five hundred miles apart, to consult on these engrossing subjects, is itself an argument of the deep solicitude felt by the country at large in their discussion. To have separated without vindicating them, would have been a desertion of the trust committed to us. Their importance required that fullness of consideration which an enlightened and reflecting people have a right to demand. It has been our study to adhere to the utmost accuracy in our statement of facts, and to exercise the most perfect candour in our arguments. We therefore invite the strictest scrutiny to what we thus submit; whilst we are sensible that, with the advantage of more time than the session of the convention has afforded, it might have been presented in a more finished form. Deeply impressed with the gravity of the subject and the momentous aspect of our national concerns, we trust that our language has never departed from that tone of conciliation which becomes citizens of the same country differing from their brethren upon great questions of national policy.

But let us bear constantly in mind that the union, the happiness, the peace and the power of our beloved country depend on its domestic industry, without which these United States would cease to be an independent nation.

Let those who acknowledge this great bond of union never forget that "united we stand and divided we fall;" that sugar, and iron, hemp and lead, wool and cotton, and the other productions of our diversified soil, elaborated by our own indefatigable industry, and protected by our own free government, are, in effect, the government that holds us together, and make us one people; that the home market is the palladium of home itself in all its most endearing and ennobling political and social relations; without which we have no common country, but should be reduced to the condition of dismembered and defenceless provinces. Let it therefore be the instinct of all who acknowledge its cause as their own, to stand together, like the fathers of the revolution; with no local jealousy, no impolitic preference of one part of our system to another, but maintaining a united and inflexible adherence to the whole.

Spontaneous conventions like the present originated our glorious revolution and our admirable constitution. May the Almighty Power that presided over their deliberations, and that has never yet failed to guard these United States, shed the gracious influence of his protection upon our labours!

WILLIAM WILKINS, of Pennsylvania,	<i>President.</i>
JAMES TALLMADGE, of N. York,	} <i>Vice Presidents</i>
GEORGE BLAKE, of Massachusetts,	
HEZEKIAH NILES, of Maryland,	} <i>Secretaries.</i>
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CHARLES PAINE, of Vermont,	

MAINE.

Joshua Wingate, Jr. Portland
 Israel Ilsley, do.
 Moses Emery, Saco
 Josiah Calef, do.

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 Lloyd W. Wells, Somersworth
 Joseph W. March, Portsmouth
 John Williams, Dover
 Robert Lefavour, Portsmouth
 Joshua W. Peirce, Somersworth
 John B. Wheeler, Orford
 Ebenezer Lord, Portsmouth
 Walter Tufts, Alstead
 David Culver, Lime
 Jeremiah Wilson, Gilmanton
 Wm. Palmer, Dover
 Saml. Garfield, Jr. Langdon
 Thos. Woolson, Claremont
 Richard Bartlett, Concord
 Robt. Rice, Portsmouth
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 Richard R. Waldron, Portsmouth
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 Francis Slason, Rutland
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 Patrick T. Jackson, do.
 Israel Thorndike, Jr. do.
 Jos. T. Buckingham, do.
 Abbott Lawrence, do.
 D. D. Broadhead, do.
 Theo. Lyman, Jr. do.
 Isaac C. Pray, do.
 Jas. T. Austin, do.
 George Blake, do.
 Edward H. Robbins, do.
 Charles Wells, do.
 Stephen White, do.
 Jonas B. Brown, do.
 Wm. Appleton, do.
 Martin Bates, do.
 Robert Rogers, do.

Willard Phillips, Boston
 Robert G. Shaw, do.
 Alex. H. Everett, do.
 John Hooper, Marblehead
 Stephen C. Phillips, Salem
 E. S. Rand, Newburyport
 William Sutton, Danvers
 Nathaniel Saltonstall, Salem
 Samuel Hoar, Concord
 William Parmenter, East Cambridge
 Nathan Crosby, Newburyport
 Charles Stearns, Springfield
 Henry K. Newcomb, Greenfield
 James Richardson, Dedham
 John Lemist, Roxbury
 Luther Metcalf, Jr. Medway
 Samuel Crocker, Taunton
 John A. Parker, New Bedford
 Shepard Leach, Easton
 Jas. C. Starkweather, Pawtucket
 Aaron Tufts, Dudley
 Nathl. P. Denny, Leicester
 Rejoice Newton, Worcester
 B. Taft, Jr. Uxbridge
 Jonas L. Sibley, Sutton
 John Milton Earle, Worcester
 Joseph Lyman, Northampton
 Henry W. Dwight, Stockbridge
 Henry Shaw, Lanesborough
 Lemuel Pomeroy, Pittsfield
 Joseph Merrick, do.
 William Lawrence, Boston
 Ebenezer Chadwick, do.
 Ezra Dyer, do.
 Amos Binney, do.
 Benj. W. Crowninshield, Salem
 Wm. P. Endicott, do.
 Russell Brown, Cheshire
 John Mills, Southwick
 Joel Norcross, Monson
 Edmund Burke, North Adams
 Danl. P. Merriam, do.
 Isaac U. Hoxie, Adams
 Elnathan Jones, Enfield
 John Wyles, Brimfield
 Horatio Lyon, Monson

RHODE ISLAND.

George Irish, Middletown
 Samuel F. Gardner, Newport
 Chris. E. Robbins, do.
 Edward Carrington, Providence
 Zach'h Allen, do.

Saml. F. Mann, Providence
 Stanford Newell, do.
 Wm. E. Richmond, do.
 Benj. Cozzens, do.
 Matthew Watson, do.
 Geo. Baker, do.
 John Whipple, do.
 Stephen Waterman, do.
 Joshua Mauran, do.
 Chas. Jackson, Scituate
 Jas. F. Simmons, Johnston
 Wm. Rhodes, Warwick
 Nathan F. Dixon, Westerly
 Peleg Wilbur, Jr. Coventry
 Chas. Eldridge, E. Greenwich
 John Allen, Centreville
 Stephen Steere, Smithfield
 Wm. A. Robinson, South Kingston
 Willet Carpenter, North Kingston
 Nathan M. Wheaton, Warren
 John Howe, Bristol
 Jas. D'Wolf, do.
 Nathl. S. Ruggles, Newport
 Rich'd Anthony, North Providence
 Wm. Field, do.

CONNECTICUT.

David Kimberly, New Haven
 Thos. G. Woodward, do.
 Nathl. R. Clark, do.
 Wm. W. Boardman, do.
 Leverett Griswold, do.
 Sidney Babcock, New Haven
 Joseph Fairchild, do.
 Hosea Hinsdale, Winchester
 Theodore Hinsdale, do.
 Thomas Watson, Jr. New Hartford
 Alanson Hamlin, Bridgeport
 Edwin Porter, do.
 Fitch Wheeler, do.
 Saml. B. Sherwood, Saugatuck
 William H. Jessup, do.
 Ebenezer Jessup, do.
 Timothy T. Merwin, Norwalk
 Algernon E. Beard, do.
 Theodore Davenport, Stamford
 Saml. P. Randall, Wilton
 Starr Ferry, Bethel Office, Danbury
 Samuel Raymond, New-Canaan
 William Watson, do.
 Joseph Barber, New Haven
 Walter Booth, Meriden
 Philip S. Galpin, New Haven

Edward S. Johnson, Stratford
 John Mather, Manchester
 Samuel D. Hubbard, Middletown
 J. G. W. Trumbull, Norwich
 Calvin Goddard, do.
 Dennis Kimberly, New Haven
 J. H. Deforest, Humphreysville
 Robt. Watkinson, Hartford
 Seth Marshall, Colebrook
 Erastus Lyman, Goshen
 John Isham, Canaan
 Henry L. Ellsworth, Hartford
 Isaac Keillogg, New Hartford
 Benjamin Deforest, Watertown
 Wm. C. Sterling, Salisbury
 David C. Collins, Hartford
 Wm. C. Gilman, Norwich
 John Boynton, South Coventry
 J. M. L. Scoville, Waterbury
 Wm. Deforest, do.
 Russell Hoyt, Danbury
 James Brewster, New Haven
 John M. Holley, Salisbury
 Henry Watson, East Windsor
 E. S. Williams, Poinfret Landing
 James Wolcott, Wolcottville
 W. R. Tiber, Bridgeport
 David Holley, Stamford
 Samuel Comstock, Norwalk
 Oliver C. Sanford, Weston
 John Hyde, Mystic
 Walter Mitchell, Hartford
 Henry S. Lee, Leesville
 Joshua L'Hommedieu, Chester
 G. D. Wadhams, Wolcottville

NEW-YORK.

John Woodward, New York
 Robert Swartwout, do.
 Martin E. Thompson, do.
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 James Lynch, do.
 Thos. R. Smith, do.
 Edwin Williams, do.
 Wm. Stevens, do.
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 James Tallmadge, do.
 Hector Craig, do.
 Anson G. Phelps, do.
 James B. Murray, do.
 Charles A. Davis, do.

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Jacob Acker, do.	Jona. Child, Rochester
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Oliver Kane, do.	Montgomery Hunt, do.
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 Robert Lee, Rahway
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 John Corvell, Lambertville
 Thomas Capner, Flemington
 Chas. C. Strattan, Swedesborough
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 David Reeves, Bridgetown, W. N. J.
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 Robert E. Hornor, Princeton
 William Tuttle, Newark
 Abraham W. Kinney, do.
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 Jonathan Cory, do.
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 Samuel Swan, Bound Brook
 Abraham Godwin, Jr., Paterson
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Amzi Dodd, Newark
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 Samuel Breck, do.
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 James Martin, do.
 Thos. P. Hoopes, do.
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